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Executive Privilege or Punishment? The
Need to Define Legitimate Invocations and
Conflict Resolution Techniques
Recent White House events such as Whitewater, Travelgate, Filegate, the
Paula Jones case, the Monica Lewinsky scandal, and the offer of clemency by
President Clinton to imprisoned Puerto Rican terrorists, have brought great
media and public attention to the interplay between Congress and the

President in the area of information gathering and withholding. On several

occasions, Presidents have attempted to block congressional oversight
committees from viewing certain documents, papers, and tapes by way of the

executive privilege. Nearly all such invocations in recent years have met with

media criticism, public skepticism, and congressional attack.' However, lost
in this public backlash to even the suggestion that the executive privilege may
be invoked are the legitimate applications of the doctrine. Due to the recent
(and unnecessary) controversies surrounding the invocation of the executive

privilege, it is important that Congress promulgate an effective system

governing its legitimate application and developing techniques for resolving
conflicts surrounding its use. This system must provide protection for the

1. President Clinton's claim of executive privilege during the Monica Lewinsky
scandal was met with media criticism stating that the "executive privilege option... was never
intended to protect a President from a criminal investigation of acts that had nothing to do with
his official duties," as well as media encouragement of a public decry against its use. No
Executive Privilege,CAP. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1998, at 6A. The President also faced Congressional

attacks as House Majority Whip Tom Delay called for President Clinton to "stop his stonewall

strategy." John C. Henry, Vote Calls on Clinton to Release Documents on Executive Privilege,

Hous. CHRON., May 22, 1998, at 9. Commentators also chastised Clinton for his use of
executive privilege when he offered clemency to Puerto Rican militants. "[B]ut now it's
looking increasingly like the invocation of executive privilege was just another effort by the
White House to hide something unsavory." Editorial, An UnpardonableDecision,N.Y. POST,
Oct. 21, 1999, at 38. "Unless a credible explanation for pardoning members of a terrorist
organization is forthcoming, reasonable people can only conclude Clinton once again is using
executive privilege to conceal misconduct."

Clinton's Pardons Stir Belief He's Abusing

PrivilegePower,PANTAGRAPH (Bloomington, IL), Sept. 28, 1999, at A12. Clinton's position
in this instance, however, was not without support, evidenced by the following statement from
one commentator:
President Clinton may yet do the impossible. He may succeed in giving
executive privilege a good name. His refusal to disclose internal
documents concerning clemency reviews for 16 convicted militant Puerto
Rican nationalists is not merely permissible. It is essential to maintaining
the separation of powers between the legislative and executive branches.

Peter M. Shane, Clinton'sRight; He Shouldn't Turn Over The Clemency Records, WASH. POST,

Sept. 26, 1999, at BI.
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President in his ability to invoke the privilege as well as restrict him to the
appropriate situations in which the executive privilege may be invoked. It
must also establish reasonable limits on the power of Congress to investigate.
Such studied and controlled application of the doctrine will help eliminate the
negative connotation surrounding the executive privilege as well as alleviate
confrontation between Congress and the President when information gathering
from the Chief Executive is at issue.
INTRODUCTION
Amidst the recognizable difficulty of a President to effectively assert
executive privilege, even though its constitutionality has received Supreme
Court recognition, it is time for a solution. There must be legislation passed
to effectively, and finally, subscribe: what are legitimate executive privilege
claims; the limitations to such claims; how to curtail investigative abuse by
Congress or the judiciary; and how to resolve conflicts when the two branches
of government reach a deadlock in negotiations.2 This comment will first
outline justifications for the doctrine of executive privilege for without
legitimate justifications there would be no conflict. Second, this comment
will examine various arguments against the doctrine of executive privilege in
order to gain an understanding of the potential for conflicts arising from
executive privilege claims. This comment will then reflect on the historical
invocations of executive privilege and the reactions (both public and
judicial/political) that followed in order to reveal the necessity for a solution
to these problems. Finally, this comment will devise a plan for the future in
dealing with executive privilege conflicts and will establish possible solutions
to limit the number of disputes and effectively resolve deadlocks between the
two branches of government.
The doctrine of executive privilege has been defined as "the President's
claim of constitutional authority to withhold information from Congress."3
The doctrine is premised on the idea that insulating conversations and
communications between executive decision makers and subordinates from
congressional and public inquiry will promote candid discussion and
ultimately candid decision making.4 However, countering this proposition is

2. This comment will focus on conflict resolution between the President (the executive
branch) and Congress (the legislative branch).
3. RAOULBERGER, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE: A CONSTITUTIONAL MYTH 1 (1974). The
executive privilege also entails withholding information from the judicial branch; however, this
comment is limited to the executive's withholding of information from Congress.
4.

Matthew Cooper Weiner, Note; In the Wake of Whitewater: Executive Privilege and
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the need, and sometimes the right, of Congress and the public to have this
information in order to "fulfill their democratic responsibilities." 5 In fact, it
has been suggested that democratic accountability will be destroyed if
Congress is limited as to its investigations and information gathering.6
The competing interests of the President and Congress have received
Supreme Court recognition over the years. As early as 1821, the Supreme
Court recognized that Congress has an inherent constitutional ability to coerce
testimony and to punish recalcitrant witnesses for contempt of court.7 As this
century began, the Court, in McGrainv. Daugherty,pronounced that Congress
had constitutional authority of great breadth to investigate and induce
cooperation.8 In fact, the Court stated, "the power of inquiry-with process
to enforce it-is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function."9 Such congressional investigative power, however, was not declared to
be limitless. In McGrain, the Court declared the investigation by Congress
must be in furtherance of a valid legislative purpose.'0 Despite these limitations, some commentators suggest that it is virtually impossible for the scope
of a congressional investigation to be successfully challenged."
Congressional authority to investigate may be limited further by an
assertion of executive privilege. Although no Supreme Court decision has
specifically involved the aforementioned limitation, the Court has stated that
separation of powers conflicts may limit the power of Congress to
investigate."2 In Barenblatt v. United States, the Supreme Court recognized
that congressional investigations are limited by separation of powers
considerations when it declared that Congress may neither "inquire into

the InstitutionalizedConflict Element of Separationof Powers, 12 J.L. & POL 775 (1996).

5. Id.

6. See MARK J. ROZELL, EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE:
DEMOCRATIC ACCOUNTABIITY (1994).
7. Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. 204 (1821).

THE DILEMMA OF SECRECY AND

8. McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927). The Court reversed a district court
order that had discharged Daugherty's brother from responding to a Senate committee's
subpoena to testify. Id. at 137.
9. Id. at 174.
10. Id. at 172.
11. Randall K. Miller, Congressional Inquests: Suffocating The Constitutional
PrerogativeOf Executive Privilege, 81 MiNN. L. REV. 631, 637 (citing Stanley M. Brand &
Sean Connelly, ConstitutionalConfrontations:PreservingA PromptAnd Orderly Means By
Which Congress May Enforce Investigative Demands Against Executive Branch Officials, 36

CATH. U. L. REV. 71, 75 n.28 (1986) ("[ilt safely may be said that a modem-day witness

challenging the legitimacy of the congressional objective engages in what is essentially a
'fruitless task."') (citing ARvO VAN AIsTYNE, CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS, 15 F.R.D. 471,
478 (1954)).

12.

Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 111 (1959).
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matters which are within the exclusive province" of the executive branch nor
"supplant the executive in what exclusively belongs to the Executive." 3

Although the Court has recognized an ability of Congress to investigate,
the Court has also recognized the ability of the President to invoke the
executive privilege in certain situations. As early as the first Presidency' that
of George Washington, the President refused to give the House information
concerning the administration's negotiations relating to the Jay Treaty of
1795.'4 James Madison, a member of the President's cabinet, "maintained that
the President may not judge the right of the House to request information, and
the House may not judge the right of the President to refuse it."" The
President never supplied the information and the Jay Treaty was negotiated
without prior consultation with the Senate. 6 However, it was not until United
States v. Nixon in 1974 that the Supreme Court itself formally recognized the
President's legitimate right to withhold information from Congress with the
invocation of the executive privilege. 7
In Nixon, the President asserted the executive privilege in an attempt to
protect records of White House communications from a subpoena arising out
of the Watergate investigation.'" The Court declared that there is a presumptive privilege of presidential communications and that this privilege is
"fundamental to the operation of Government and inextricably rooted in the
separation of powers under the Constitution."1 9 The Court noted the necessity
to protect "communications between high Government officials and those who
advise and assist them in the performance of their manifold duties," where the
importance of confidentiality "is too plain to require further discussion.""0
The constitutionality of the executive privilege was ultimately solidified when
the Court said protection of the confidentiality of presidential communications
has constitutional underpinnings.2 Again, the Court was not willing to extend
this privilege without some limitations.

13. Id.at111-12.
14. Weiner, supra note 4, at 794.
15. Weiner, supra note 4, at 793 (citing JOSEPH BESsETrE & JEFFREY TULIs, THE
PRESIDENCY IN1THE CONSTrTMmONAL ORDER 50-51(1981)).
16. Id.
17. See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).

18.

Id.

19. Id. at 708.
20. Id. at 705.
21. Id. at 705. The Court also stated that "[w]hatever the nature of the privilege of
confidentiality of Presidential communications in the exercise of Art. II powers, the privilege
can be said to derive from the supremacy of each branch within its own assigned area of
constitutional duties. Certain powers and privileges flow from the nature of enumerated
powers." Id.
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As the Court limited congressional inquiry only to situations where
.legislative purposes were being served, the Nixon Court required that the
legitimate privilege of the President be subject to a balancing test. The Court
framed the need for this test:
[h]owever, neither the doctrine of separation of powers, nor
the need for confidentiality of high-level communications,
without more, can sustain an absolute, unqualified Presidential privilege... The President's need for complete candor
and objectivity from advisers calls for great deference from
the courts. However, when the privilege depends solely on
the broad, undifferentiated claim of public interest in the
confidentiality of such conversations, a confrontation with
other values arises. 22
Despite ultimately denying Nixon's invocation of the executive privilege, the
Court finally gave formal recognition and legitimacy to its invocation.
Although the Supreme Court has recognized both the right of Congress
and gather information as well as the right of the President to
investigate
to
invoke executive privilege in relation to the congressional inquest, the courts
would prefer that these two branches of government negotiate and resolve
their own conflicts without judicial intervention. In a prominent district court
opinion, United States v. House of Representatives, the court "held that the
federal courts should delay adjudication of congressional-executive information disputes until the officer asserting executive privilege is criminally
prosecuted for contempt of Congress, at which time such official could raise
the privilege as a defense."23 Later in this comment the problems of such an
approach, as well as possible solutions, will be addressed.
Controversies surrounding a presidential invocation of executive
privilege tend to follow a general pattern. In a typical scenario, Congress (or
a congressional subcommittee of some sort), the judiciary (by way of a
subpoena duces tecum), or an Independent Counsel will desire the acquisition
of certain information from the executive branch. This could come in the

22. 1l at 706. The Supreme Court also balanced the President's right to confidentiality
with the Court's right to specific evidence in a pending criminal trial declaring, "we must weigh
the importance of the general privilege of confidentiality of Presidential communications in
performance of the President's responsibilities against the inroads of such a privilege on the fair
administration of criminal justice." Id. at 711-12.
23. See Miller, supra note 11, at 633 citing United States v. House of Representatives,
556 F. Supp. 150, 153 (D.C. 1983). See also United States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 551
F.2d 384, 395 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (remanding the case and ordering the parties to continue
negotiations, reaching the merits only on appeal after remand).
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form of an official congressional request for information, a subpoena (as in
Nixon), or as a result of an investigation of the Office of Independent
Counsel.24 Facing a demand to turn over information, the President has
several choices: (1) the President could turn over some information, but not
all, in hopes of appeasing the inquirer; (2) turn over all of the information to
the inquirer; or (3) attempt to protect all of the information by an invocation
of executive privilege. Past Presidents have chosen the first option with
limited success, for example, when President Nixon initially publicly released
edited transcripts of forty-three conversations-including portions of twenty
conversations subject to a subpoena.2" Ultimately, Nixon was forced to
submit all subpoenaed information for in camera26 inspection. 2' The second
option is typically not appealing to the President unless the release of the
requested information would not harm the public interest or would not be
damaging, politically or privately, to the President. As for the third option, the
President's invocation of executive privilege is almost certain to be met with
a challenge by the inquirer. History has proved that the President faces an
uphill battle when his assertion of executive privilege is challenged. 28
In the post-Watergate era, American citizens have come to intensely
distrust government, especially executive, secrecy. 29 Formal battles between
the President and Congress over access to information have resulted in great
political damage as well as negotiation losses to the President. The role the
media plays in suffocating executive privilege is substantial as headlines,
editorials, and comments suggest corruption and cover-up when the President

24. During the Monica Lewinsky scandal, Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr sought
information from the President concerning his relationship with Ms. Lewinsky. His demands
were initially thwarted by an invocation of the executive privilege. See also United States v.
Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (where the controversy arose from an impeachment investigation in the
House).
25. Nixon, supra note 17, at 688. The release by Nixon of some subpoenaed
information did not satisfy the district court. Less than one month later, the district court
ordered the President to deliver to the court the originals of all subpoenaed items, as well as an
index and analysis of those items, together with tape copies of those portions of the subpoenaed

recordings for which transcripts had been released to the public. Id.at 689.

26. Under certain circumstances, a trial judge may inspect a document which counsel
wishes to use at trial in his chambers before ruling on its admissibility or its use. BLACK's LAW
DICrIONARY 763 (7th ed. 1999).
27. See discussion supra note 22.
28. See Miller, supra note 11, at 634.
29. A state court judge said on point that "Americans hate secrecy, they detest it, they
got a rid of a President for it." Michael G. Wagner, Drug Tests ofRacehorses Ordered Released,
SACRAMENTO BEE, Apr. 2, 1993, at A6 (quoting Sacramento Superior Court Judge James Ford).

EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
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asserts the privilege.3" In effect, Presidents who choose this option become
greatly weakened in their ability to effectively assert executive privilege.
I.
A.

EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE

ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE

Without legitimate support for the doctrine of executive privilege no
debate would ever arise surrounding its invocation because, in all likelihood,
there would be no invocations of the doctrine. This analysis focuses on a few
of the arguments often offered in defense of the privilege. A discussion of the
Framers' intent is necessary when evaluating the doctrine in order to establish
the initial support for its legitimacy. Further, various safeguards for which the
executive privilege serves must be evaluated.
1. Separationof Powers
Inherent in the United States Constitution is the idea of a separation of
powers between the three branches of government. 3 Each branch was given
certain powers that were not given to the other branches. Essential to this idea
is that each branch has the power to carry out its constitutional initiatives
unhindered by activities of the other branches. Although our system
implemented checks and balances in order to prevent the abuse of or
tyrannical power of any one branch, Founder James Madison urged that "if it
be a fundamental principle of free Govt. that the Legislative, Executive, &
Judiciary powers should be separately exercised, it is equally so that they be
independently exercised."32
Despite a lack of textual reference, there is no doubt that the Framers
intended a system adopting the doctrine of separation of powers. Taking their
cues from the leading constitutional thinkers, John Locke and Baron de
Montesquieu, 3 it was of the utmost importance to divide power among the
30. Editorials have urged that Americans decry the President's assertion of executive
privilege as they did when Nixon sought to assert executive privilege in order to avoid
questioning about the Watergate scandal. No Executive Privilege, CAPITAL TIMES, Mar. 24,
1998, at 6A. David Bloom of MSNBC suggested that D.C. District Court Judge Johnson, ruling
on an assertion of privileged communications between the President and Secret Service agents,
"seemed to imply at one point that the president may have something to hide." Internight
newscast, MSNBC, May 22, 1998 available in 1998 WL 6633482.
31. See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, art. II, art. III.
32. The Records Of The Federal Convention of 1787, at 56 (Max Ferrand ed., 1911).
33. ROZEU, supra note 6, at 23 (describing the importance of the views of Locke and
Montesquieu, the "modem constitutionalists," as the Framers put together ideas for the United
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several branches' of government as opposed to delegating power to one
dominant branch-a system that Americans rebelled against in our fight for
independence. The Framers also sought to provide each branch with the
ability to prevent any one branch from tyrannical action. This system
enveloping the two fundamental goals of the Framers-separation of powers
and checks and balances-would therefore consist of an internal balancing
mechanism by which governmental powers could be used without a great fear
of abuse.35 Montesquieu considered the fear of a system that allowed
tyrannical power in a dominant branch when he expressed, "[w]hen the
legislative and executive powers are united in the same person, or in the same
body of magistracy, there can be then no liberty; because apprehensions may
arise, lest the same monarch or senate should enact tyrannical laws, to execute
them in a tyrannical manner."36 He continued, "[m]iserable indeed would be
the case, were the same man, or the same body whether of the nobles or of the
people, to exercise those three powers, that of enacting laws, that of executing
the public resolutions, and that of judging the crimes or differences of
individuals."" Nonetheless, Montesquieu gave the executive the power to act
with some discretion in times of emergency despite a lack of a specific
legislative grant.3" In fact, commentators suggest that the two modern
constitutional thinkers saw executive power as a broad residual power that
was available when other governmental powers failed.39 Even more revealing
is the power of secrecy available via the doctrine of separation of powers.
Commentator Gary Schmitt observed that in response to an 1808 congressional resolution requesting military information from the President, it was
actually congressional members who believed they had "no power to coerce
information" and that Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution had made the
President the sole judge of what he could communicate.'
States Constitution).

34. JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT Ch. 12, §§ 143-48 (BobbsMerrill 1952) (1690). Locke distinguished the three branches of governmental power as the
legislative, the executive, and the "federative." Id.
35. See generally Weiner, supra note 4, at 775 (discussing the separation of powers
defense of executive privilege).
36. BARONDEMONTESQUIEU,THE SPlRrrOFLAws 202 (David Wallace Carrithers ed.,

1977) (1748).

37. Id.
38. Id.
39. ROZELL, supra note 6, at 25 ("the Framers had in mind [their] idea of a divided
initiative in the matter of legislation and a broad range of autonomous executive power or
'prerogative,"' quoting from "constitutional scholar Edward S. Corwin" EDWARD S. CORWIN,
THE PRESIDENT: OFICE AND POWERS, 1787-1948 (New York Univ. Press, 3d ed. (1948)).
40. Id. at 32. Article II, Section 3 states as follows: "He (the President) shall from time
to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union, and recommend to their
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The concept of giving the President some discretionary power surfaced
again in the historic case of Marbury v. Madison."' Speaking for the Court,
Chief Justice John Marshall wrote, "the president is invested with certain
important political powers, in the exercise of which he is to use his own
discretion, and is accountable only to his country in his political character, and
to his own conscience."'42 Marshall also commented that the President has
discretionary power as the sole voice of the country when dealing with foreign
nations.4 3 Other Supreme Court Justices have identified the discretionary
power of Presidents to entertain secrecy in achieving their executive
responsibilities."
Despite the recognition of executive power to withhold secrets, there was
considerable fear of tyrannical action by any one of the three branches of
government. The Framers sought to remedy this potential evil by use of
checks and balances. Again, Montesquieu stated that "it is necessary that by
the very disposition of things power should be a check to power.' '4 Madison,
writing in The Federalist, urged that allowing each branch to retain some
influence over the other two branches was the best way for each branch to
protect itself:
[b]ut the great security against a gradual concentration of
the several powers in the same department, consists in
giving to those who administer each department, the
necessary constitutional means, and personal motives, to
resist encroachment of the others. The provision for
defense must in this, as in all other cases, be made commensurate to the danger of attack ...The constant aim is to
divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner as
that each may be a check on the other.46
Thus, it becomes clear that the Framers wanted each branch of government to
exert independent powers while at the same time they wanted to prohibit the
aggrandizement of the other co-equal branches.
Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient." U.S. CONST. art. II,
§3.
41. 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
42. Id. at 166.
43.

DANIEL L. FELDMAN, THE LOGIC OF AMERICAN GOVERNMENT: APPLYING THE

(1990).
44. See ROZELL, supra note 6, at 30 (quoting Justice Joseph Story who stated that the
President "is compelled to resort to secret and unseen influences, to private interviews, and
private arrangements, to accomplish his own appropriate purposes.").
45. MONTESQUIEU, supra note 36, at 200.
46. THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 349 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
CONSTITUION TO THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 82
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Although there is no direct mention of the executive privilege in the
Constitution, commentators believe the privilege of confidentiality is
constitutionally based so far as it relates to the President's effective discharge
of his executive powers.47 The Framers' comments, on the whole, suggest that
they intended that the executive have limited rights to secrecy while the
legislature have investigatory powers." The Nixon Court, the first to officially
recognize executive privilege, supported the separation of powers argument
in favor of the doctrine of executive privilege.49 This is evidenced by its
declaration that the privilege derives from the supremacy of each branch in the
process of carrying out its constitutional responsibilities. 0 In addition, the
Court declared that the privilege is "fundamental to the operation of
Government and inextricably rooted in the separation of powers under the
Constitution."'" This is not to say that the privilege is unconditional.
Although the need to protect confidential communications is derived
from the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers, the executive
privilege is not absolute but rather a qualified privilege.52 The Nixon Court,
although not clearly delineating parameters for the privilege, established that
"[t]he impediment that an absolute, unqualified privilege would place in the
way of the primary constitutional duty of the Judicial Branch to do justice in
criminal prosecutions would plainly conflict with the function of the courts
under Art. M."" The Court declared that, within the separateness of the three
branches of government, there must also be interdependence such that the
government will exist in a workable system.'
47. Glenn T. Williams, Temporary Immunity: DistinguishingCase Law Opinions on
Executive Immunity and Privilege as the Supreme Court Tackles an Oxymoron, 21 NOVA L.
REV. 969,993 (1997). See also Andrea L Wolff, The Federal Advisory Committee Act and the
Executive Privilege: Resolving the Separation of Powers Issue, 5 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 1023,

1040(1995).
48. See Weiner, supra note 4, at 786 (citing JOSEPH BESSETrE &JEFTREY Tuus, THE
PRESIDENCY IN THE CONSTMtMONAL ORDER 63-64 (1981), "examining the Framers'
conceptions of republican government and Madison's conception of the president as 'an
independent executive capable of improving the law and checking the legislature without going
beyond the law or superseding the legislature."').
49. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 705.
50. The Nixon Court declared, "[w]hatever the nature of the privilege of confidentiality
of Presidential communications in the exercise of Art. II powers, the privilege can be said to
derive from the supremacy of each branch within its own assigned area of constitutional duties."
Id.
51. Id. at 708.
52. Wolff, supra note 47, at 1040.
53. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 707.
54. Id. The Supreme Court stated, "[i]n designing the structure of our Government and
dividing and allocating the sovereign power among three co-equal branches, the Framers of the
Constitution sought to provide a comprehensive system, but the separate powers were not
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The DeliberativeProcess

In addition to the separation of powers argument, there is a considerable
need for candor between the President and his advisers." The quality of

advice given the President during deliberations would suffer if those involved
believed that their discussions were subject to public disclosure. 56 Advisers
may well temper their honesty, candor, frankness, and perhaps bluntness if
their confidential advice is not protected.57 As Mark J. Rozell, associate
professor of political science at Mary Washington College,58 suggests,
President Nixon unfortunately invoked executive privilege to protect himself
from potentially incriminating candid deliberations-and in the process
59
helped give the constitutional doctrine a bad name for many people.
Notwithstanding such abuses,' the need for candid communications is no less

important.

The Supreme Court has recognized the need for candor in the delibera62
tive process 61 between the President and those who advise and assist him.
The Court remarked that "[h]uman experience teaches that those who expect

public dissemination of their remarks may well temper candor with a concern

for appearances and for their own interests to the detriment of the
decisionmaking process."'6 3 The Nixon Court opined that the courts must give
great deference to the President relative to his need for confidentiality with his
intended to operate with absolute independence." Id. The Court continued its establishment of

the interdependence framework by quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S.

at 635, "[w]hile the Constitution diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates
that practice will integrate the dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon
its branches separateness but interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity." Id.
55.

See generallyLeonard G. Ratner, Executive Privilege,Self Incrimination,and the

Separationof Powers Illusion, 22 UCLA L. REV. 92, 94 (1974) ("[t]he presidential claim of
executive privilege clearly is grounded in the Constitution. The president's constitutional
functions necessitate consultation with advisers, and the possibility of disclosure may well
inhibit the candor of their advice. In addition, disclosure of diplomatic, military, or national
security secrets may prejudice national interests.").
56. ROZELL, supra note 6, at 54.
57. Id. Rozell warns that the consequences of a lack of secrecy could be very serious.
58. Rozell's book EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE stands in part as a challenge to the analysis
of UCLA professor Raoul Berger who believes that Presidents who have exercised executive
privilege have acted outside their constitutional authority. ROZELL, supra note 6, at xi.
59. Idat 6.

60. See discussion infra Sections I, B, 3 and II.
61. See Miller, supra note 11, at 640 for an expansion on the following safeguards of
executive privilege: deliberative process privilege, military and state secrets, law enforcement
strategies and secrets, and presidential privacy.
62. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 705.
63. Id.
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advisers." In a more recent decision concerning First Lady Hillary Rodham
Clinton and the Task Force on Health Care, the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals expounded on this legitimate executive privilege safeguard of the
deliberative process by declaring that the Framers contemplated confidentiality as essential to the President in his exercise of executive power. 65

Furthermore, the court reasoned that the Framers empowered a solitary person
with the presidency "for the very reason that he might maintain secrecy in
executive operations" and so that he may deliberate in confidence.'
Ultimately, such deliberations under protection from public dissemination
should result in quick and confident decisions by the President.67
3. Militaryand NationalSecurity Secrets
The executive privilege has also been legitimized via the necessity of
protecting military and state secrets in promotion of national security. In the

modern arena of international events, it is virtually impossible for the
President to react accordingly only after political deliberations with the other
branches of government (specifically, Congress). 68 Leading Framers
recognized that the Presidency-by being of one man as opposed to
many-lends itself well to acting with "unity, secrecy, dispatch, and
resolve., '69 The modem view of the courts has been to allow the President
considerable leeway in describing the national security interest affected by

disclosure of information as well as in defining the appropriate recourse in

64. Id. at 706. In justifying a "presumptive privilege" with regard to Presidential
communications, the Court reasoned that "[a] President and those who assist him must be free
to explore alternatives in the process of shaping policies and making decisions and to do so in
a way many would be unwilling to express except privately." Id. at 708.
65. Association of American Physicians and Surgeons, Inc. v. Clinton, 997 F.2d 898,
909 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (stating, "Article II not only gives the President the ability to consult with
his advisers confidentially, but also, as a corollary, it gives him the flexibility to organize his
advisers and seek advice from them as he wishes."). Again referring to constitutional powers,
the court indicated that it is a necessity for the President to have the ability to deliberate
confidentially, and that without such ability "the President's performance of any of his duties
-textually explicit or implicit in Article II's grant of executive power - would be made more
difficult." Id.
66.

Id.

67. Id. Secrecy enables the President to act quickly, which is a quality the Framers
believed to be lacking in the President in the government established by the Articles of
Confederation. Id. This secrecy may also allow the President to act fearlessly. See Nixon v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 752 (1982) (where the Court recognized the interest of the public in
allowing an official "the maximum ability to deal fearlessly ...with the duties of his office.").
68. See ROZEIL, supra note 6, at 49.
69. Id.
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national security situations.7 ° Rozell warns of the potential harmful effect of
public dissemination concerning such policy discussions:
[s]uch openness, for example, could lead to demands for the
executive branch to act before it is prepared to do so.
Consequently, the ability to deliberate carefully over time
and weigh options before making decisions could be
compromised. In national security policy-making, it often
is important to be somewhat removed from time and
partisan pressures that may affect policy decisions."
In United States v. Reynolds,72 the Court issued a strong defense of
executive branch secrecy concerning national security holding that "it may be
possible to satisfy the court, from all the circumstances of the case, that there
is a reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military
secrets which, in the interest of national security, should not be divulged."73
Relying on Reynolds,74 the Nixon Court declared that, when there may be
danger to the national security from the exposure of evidence withheld by the
President, the assertion of executive privilege is appropriate. 75 The courts
should offer the President a high degree of deference when the claim of
executive privilege is based on a "need to protect military, diplomatic, or
70. A. Stephen Boyan, Jr., Presidents and National Security Powers: A Judicial
Perspective, Address at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Association, Washington,
D.C., (Sept. 1-4 1998). Boyan, Jr., after a review of cases in the area of national security
concerns, observed, "while the courts rhetorically support the separation of powers, in varying
degrees they accept presidential characterization of the disputed matter without challenge and
they permit the president to act without clear legislative authorization." Id. See also Chicago
and Southern Air Lines v. Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103, 111 (1948) (holding that
"[i]t would be intolerable that courts, without the relevant information, should review and
perhaps nullify actions of the Executive taken on information properly held secret"). See also
ROZELu, supra note 6, at 51 ("[t]he courts have agreed that it is neither constitutionally proper
nor prudent for Congress to tie the hands of the president in foreign affairs during an emergency
situation.").
71. RoZEIL, supra note 6, at 50.
72. 345 U.S. 1 (1952).
at 10.
73. Id.
74.

Id.

Nixon, 418 U.S. at 710. The Court in Reynolds reasoned that when there is:
a reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence will expose military
matters which, in the interest of national security, should not be
divulged... the occasion for the privilege is appropriate, and the court
should not jeopardize the security which the privilege is meant to protect
by insisting upon an examination of the evidence, even by the judge
alone, in chambers.
Reynolds, 345 U.S. at 10.
75.
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sensitive national security secrets."'76 The reason for such deference may well
stem from inherent problems of Congress in maintaining secrecy.77 It is very
difficult to keep secrets among such a large group of individuals who are
politically motivated." For various reasons, and in various situations, a
particular Congressperson may choose to divulge secret information hoping
for some personal gain.79 In a critical examination of the possibility of such
secrecy leaks, one commentator stated the following:
[t]here can be no guarantee that information coming into the
hands of Congress or the whole membership of one of its
major committees will long remain secret... There is no
assurance... that so large a body of men will not include
a percentage, to be expected on statistical grounds, of
subversives, alcoholics, psychopaths and other security
risks."8"
4. Privacy
The executive privilege may also protect the personal privacy of the
President. However, there is some debate as to the extent that the President
can protect private materials because of the very public nature of his
position."' In Nixon v. Administratorof GeneralServices, 2 President Nixon
challenged the constitutionality of the Presidential Recordings and Materials
Preservation Act. 3 The Supreme Court recognized that the President is "not
wholly without constitutionally protected privacy rights in matters of personal
life unrelated to any acts done by [him] in [his] public capacity."84 However,
the Court ultimately held that the Act did not impermissibly infringe on the
former President's privacy interests.8 5 The Court implemented a balancing
test in the realm of personal presidential privacy: the right of the President to
76. Nixon, 418 U.S. at 706.
77. See ROZELL, supra note 6, at 52.
78. Id.

79. Id.
80. Joseph W. Bishop, The Executive's Right to Privacy,66 YALE L.J. 477,487 (1957).
Rozell cites various examples of the potential for congressional members to not maintain
secrecy. See ROZELL, supra note 6, at 52-53.
81. See Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977) (striking a
balance between the President's right to privacy and the ability of Congress to access his/her
private materials).

82.
83.
84.
85.

433 U.S. 425 (1977).
Id. at 426.
Id. at 457.
Id.
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protect personal, private materials "cannot be considered in the abstract...

any intrusion [on the President's privacy] must be weighed against the public
interest" in the disclosure of the materials requested.86 Furthermore, the Court
necessitated that the private documents would be processed in an orderly
manner in order to return to the President such of those that were private and
personal. s7 The extent of public access to these materials was also limited by
the terms of the Act."

At a minimum, the Court's holding suggests some protection for the

89 However, it is
President over his private and personal communications.
imperative that the President not be viewed as possessing the protections of

normal citizens for he has chosen a public life and therefore limited his/her

right to privacy. 90 As mentioned above, the President's interest in privacy
must be balanced against the offsetting interest of Congress and the public in
receiving disclosure. 9'
B. ARGUMENTS AGAINST EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE
Notwithstanding the Supreme Court's recognition of the legitimacy of
the executive privilege, arguments have been made against its application,
validity, and constitutionality. The focus of these arguments has been the lack
of textual reference in the United States Constitution to the executive
privilege. In the following paragraphs, various arguments against the doctrine
are discussed, namely that the doctrine lacks a constitutional basis, democratic
accountability affords Congress and the public the "right to know," and the
doctrine of executive privilege invites abuse.

86. Id. at 458. The Court ultimately held that the privacy interest asserted by former
President Nixon was not as strong as the interest of the archivists. Id. The Court stated that
purely private papers and recordings would be returned to the President under the terms of the
Act. Id. at 459.
87. Id. at 436.
88. Id. The evidence seemed to support the Court's decision to allow the Administrator
to receive the requested materials for President Nixon admitted that of the 42 million pages of
documents and 880 tape recordings, only a small portion were private. Id. at 459.
89. The Court recognized "private" information as personal and family finances,
communications between the President and his wife, children, physician, lawyer, clergyman,
close friends, as well as personal diaries, among other things. Id. at 459.
90. The Court recognized that when the President entered public life "he voluntarily
surrendered the privacy secured by law for those who elect not to place themselves in the public
spotlight." Id. at 455.
91. See infra Section II for a discussion of the futility of the President in invoking
executive privilege over private materials.
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1. Executive PrivilegeLacks a ConstitutionalBasis
Opponents of the executive privilege have gone so far as to describe it

as a "constitutional myth."'92 Such critics maintain a formalist view of
constitutional interpretation where all presidential powers must be traced to
a specific textual reference. Lacking any such explicit grant in the Constitution, the power of the executive to withhold information becomes at the very
least questionable.9 3 According to this strict theory of constitutional reading,
had the Framers intended the executive branch to possess such a power, they

would have expressly granted it in Article II of the Constitution.9 However,
history has indicated that some powers of the President, and Congress as well,
have been legitimized despite the lack of an express grant of power in the

Constitution.95 Opponents of the privilege are quick to counter the allowance
of the privilege via an implied power of the executive by pronouncing the

undeniable purposes of a system of checks and balances. Even in the realm
of foreign affairs (entailing both war powers and executive agreements)

opponents pronounce that "no branch of government has authority that is so
large as to be essentially undefined and uncircumscribed, that is 'plenary,' that
is not checked, not balanced, not even the President, not even in foreign
affairs."96 The logical extension to this argument is that the independent
executive privilege cannot be legitimate because it may give the executive the
authority, despite a system of checks and balances, "to act without congressio'
nal consent or even knowledge." 97

92. See BERGER, supra note 3, at 1.
93. See 104 CONG. REC. 3, 3853 (1958) (statement of Rep. George Meader): "It is
amazing to me that a nonexistent, imaginary so-called Executive Privilege, nowhere recognized
in the Constitution, in statutes or in court decisions, can seriously be advanced to destroy the
expressly vested legislative power, as well as the investigative power which inheres in it."
94. RozEu, supra note 6, at 8-9. Rozell cites a speech from former President and Chief
Justice of the Supreme Court, William Howard Taft, who buttressed the view of strict
constitutional interpretation by saying:
[t]he true view of the executive function is, as I conceive it, that the
president can exercise no power which cannot be fairly and reasonably
traced to some specific grant of power or justly implied and included
within such express grant as proper and necessary to its exercise...
There is no undefined residuum of power which he can exercise because
it seems to him to be in the public interest.

Id.

95. Id. at 9. For example, it has been recognized that the President has implied war
powers and the freedom to make executive agreements. Congress has been allowed to form
independent regulatory agencies. Id.

96.
(1990).
97.

Louis HENKIN, CONSTITUTIONALiSM, DEMOCRACY, AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS

ROZEu, supra note 6, at 10.

36
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It is also argued that the Constitution's explicit mention of allowing
98
limited secrecy to Congress alone defeats any attempt of executive secrecy.
Article I, Section 5, Clause 3 of the Constitution proclaims that "[e]ach House
shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the
9
same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy." Thus,
opponents would argue, the Framer's intent was to vest the limited power of
secrecy in the hands of Congress alone and not in the hands of the President-whom is "always subject to the constitutional supervision and judgment
of Congress."'"
The formalist position receives further support for prohibiting executive
secrecy by interpreting Article 11 to guarantee executive accountability to
Congress. Article II, Section 4 is the impeachment provision: "[t]he President
...shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of,
Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors."'' Coupled with
the congressional right to impeach is the right of the House of Representatives
(the impeaching body)'to have unfettered access to information from the
°z
executive branch in order to conduct such an investigation." Clearly, if the
President can withhold information at his discretion, then the House cannot
properly conduct.investigations involving the executive branch.
In addition to Article II, Section 4, constitutional scholar Raoul Berger
insists that Section 3 extinguishes any legitimate claim of executive
privilege. 3 This provision provides that the President "shall from time to
time give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union, and
recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary
and expedient."" Berger believes that this provision supports Congress'
"absolute power of inquiry" the duty to provide information "from time to
time" is, according to Berger, the "reciprocal of the familiar legislative power

98. Historian Raoul Berger stated, "in the Constitution the Framers provided for limited
secrecy by Congress alone, thereby excluding executive secrecy from the public." Raoul
Berger, The Incarnation of Executive Privilege, 22 UCLA L. REV. 4, 16 (1974).
3.
99. U.S. Const. art. I, § 5, cl.
100. BERGER, supra note 3, at 41.
101. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 4.
102. See BERGER, supra note 3, at 41 (quoting an 1843 House report which described
the investigative power of the House as follows: "[t]he House has the sole right of impeachment.
.power which implies the right of inquiry on the part of the House to the fullest and most
unlimited extent").
103. ROZELL, supra note 6, at 11.
104. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
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to inquire."' 5 With a belief that Congress is possessed of an absolute power
to inquire, some find it difficult to legitimize the executive privilege." °
2.

The "Right to Know"

Opponents of the privilege contend that in a democratic government both
the people and the legislature must be fully informed of executive branch
activity in order to appropriately conduct their democratic responsibilities.0 7
The legislative function includes balancing between alternatives with respect
to appropriations for the executive, cost-benefit analysis, and developing
governmental policy strategies. "The refusal to make information available
to the Congress when needed for its legislative functions is inimical to the
power of the Congress to fulfill its legislative duties."' ' Furthermore, the
executive branch is a vital source for information because the legislative
branch will look to its members to determine "whether public policies are
faithfully being executed."'" Even the Supreme Court has recognized the
necessity of executive information in the legislative process in stating, "[i]n
actual legislative practice power to secure needed information by such
[investigatory] means has long been treated as an attribute of power to
legislate.""'
Critics of executive privilege contend that inherent in the right of the
legislature to know executive information is the right to obtain this information quickly. The legislature must receive executive information in a timely
manner if it is to consult on an executive decision rather than merely be
informed after the fact."' Coupled with this consideration are the benefits
decisionmakers receive from the exposure to various viewpoints. Congressional members believe that they are well equipped to provide the President with
intelligent and diverse opinions as the executive prepares to make a
decision."' Rozell indicates that beyond the timeliness consideration,"' there
105. See ROZELL, supra note 6, at 12.
106. Id. Berger also views the Article II, Section 3 provision mandating that the
President "shall take care that the laws be faithfully executed" as providing fodder for his
accountability position, for he queries, "[w]ho has a more legitimate interest in inquiring
whether a law has been faithfully executed than the lawmaker?" Id.
107. Id. at 14.
108. Statement before the Subcomm. on Separationof Powers of the Comm. on the
Judiciary,92nd Cong. (1971), reprintedin 117 CONG. REC. 22,28990 (1977) (statement of Sen.
Sam Ervin).
109. ROZEu.., supra note 6, at 15.
110. See McGrain,supra note 8, at 161.
111. ROZEtL, supra note 6,at 16.
112. Id.
113. Id. The author quotes a House report on the role of Congress in the policy process:
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is also a concern for the maintenance of the secrecy of information once it is
divulged to the legislative branch. 114
The executive is highly concerned with the potential for dissemination
of information from Congress to the public, even when the "sensitivity" of the
material has been stressed to congressional members, for some members have
immediately "walked outside and talked to the press on the White House
grounds."' " Such concerns do little to dissuade critics of the privilege as they
maintain that the public has a right to know "everything about the operations
of the executive branch in a democratic system of government."' " 6 The public
needs this information to fulfill its democratic duties--to make informed
decisions concerning its choice of leaders and its approval of the actions of
these elected officials." 7 Thus, despite the hesitancy of the President in
divulging sensitive material, claiming the executive privilege would interfere
with the public's role as it disrupts the free flow of information."'
3. Executive Misuse of the Privilege
At the epicenter of the most frequent and recent attacks on the doctrine
of executive privilege is the potential, and invitation, for abuse. The
Watergate scandal brought into the public consciousness the reality of such
abuse as President Nixon attempted to maintain secrecy over tapes of
conversations related to the concealing of the break-in at the Democratic Party
headquarters." 9 Nixon went so far as to claim that his absolute power of the
executive privilege could be extended to and claimed by anyone in the entire
"[ulnless consultation is timely, it loses a good deal of its impact and 'effective' relations are
of only symbolic value."
114. Id.
115.

H.R. Executive-Legislative Consultation on Foreign Policy: Strengthening

Executive PrivilegeProcedures,House Foreign Affairs Comm., Special Subcomm. on Invest.,
Cong. and Foreign Pol'y Series, No. 2, 40 (Comm. Print 1981).
116. ROZELL, supra note 6, at 17.
117. See Weiner, supra note 4, at 780.
118. See Ervin, supra note 108, at 28990, stating Sen. Ervin's description of how
executive secrecy affects information flow:
[Tjhe practice of executive privilege.. . is clearly in contravention of the
basic principle that the free flow of ideas and information and open and
full disclosure of the governing process is essential to the operation of a
free society. Throughout history rulers have invoked secrecy regarding
their actions in order to enslave the citizenry. A government whose
actions are completely visible to all of its citizens is a government, which
best protects the freedoms which the Founding Fathers attempted to
Id.

embody in the Constitution.

119.

See Nixon, supra note 17, at 683.
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executive branch."n In early 1998, the privilege was host to an attack on the
grounds that President Clinton abused the privilege with his attempts to
protect conversations between himself and various aides regarding his
relationship with Monica Lewinsky."2 In the fall of 1999, Clinton's motives
concerning his invocation of executive privilege were questioned. Commentators suggested the impetus for his invocation of the privilege when Congress
subpoenaed documents regarding an offer of clemency to convicted Puerto
Rican terrorists was illegitimate and that the President sought only to protect
revelations that his decision was not supported by several other law enforcement agencies.'2" In the above situations, the privilege was not invoked for the
protection of a potentially legitimate national security interest or concern.
Rather, the privilege was invoked right in line with what concerns many
detractors.
Rozell suggests that the privilege may be invoked to "cover up illegal or
unethical governmental activities" and also may be used "to hide embarrassing
information."'"
Invocations on such grounds clearly are not supported by
national safety interests and instead serve to further public mistrust of
governmental power." United States Senator Edward M. Kennedy (D-Mass)
stated, "[g]overnment secrecy breeds government deceit, that executive
privilege nurtures executive arrogance, that national security is frequently the
cover for political embarrassment, and that the best antidote to official
malfeasance, misfeasance, and nonfeasance is the sunshine and fresh air of
full public disclosure of official activities.' 25
The potential for
abuse--invocations of the privilege at "inappropriate times"1 26-- may be cited
120. ROZELL, supra note 6, at 19.
121. See In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F. Supp. 2d 21, 26 (D.C. 1998) (ruling that
"[p]urely private conversations that did not touch on any aspect of the President's official duties
or relate in some manner to presidential decision-making would not properly fall within the
executive privilege"). See generally, John Solomon, Clinton Rejects Watergate Parallels,
ORANGE COUNTY REG., May 7, 1998, at A25; White House Gets Monday Deadline, CHI. TRIB.,
May 29, 1998, at 1; John C. Henry, Vote Calls on Clinton to Release Documents on Executive
Privilege, Hous. CHRON., May 22, 1998, at 9; Kathy Kiely, New StarrQuery Irks White House,
N.Y. DAILY NEWS, June 2, 1998, at 2; No Executive Privilege,CAP. TIMES, Mar 24,1998, at 6A
(detailing public and executive reaction to court rulings involving the President's invocation of
the executive privilege in this regard).
122. See Clinton Should State Casefor Releasing Terrorists,ATtAwA J., Oct. 21, 1999,
at A22 (stating that, in offering clemency, Clinton rejected the counsel of the FBI, the Bureau
of Prisons, U.S. attorneys in Illinois and Connecticut, and police officials across the nation).
123. ROZEI, supra note 6, at 18.
124. Id.
125. Freedomof Information; Executive Privilege;Secrecy in Gov., HearingsBefore the
Subcomm. on Admin. Prac.and Procedure and Separationof Powers of the Comm. on Gov.
Operations,93d Cong., 1st Sess., Apr. 10, 11, 12; May 8, 9, 10, 16; June 7, 8, 11, 26 (1973).
126. Weiner, supra note 4, at 780.
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to prove its illegitimacy and necessitate its eradication. Ironically, it was
former President Nixon who expounded on the potentiality for such public
distrust and presidential abuse of the executive privilege-in particular when
used to maintain secrecy over executive actions. "The plea for secrecy could
become a cloak for errors, misjudgments, and other failings of government."'2 7
Despite the above arguments to the contrary, history and precedent have
shown that the doctrine of executive privilege is a viable and valid exercise of
executive power.
II.

HISTORICAL INVOCATIONS OF THE EXECUTIVE PRIVILEGE

A brief reflection on several historical invocations of the privilege and
the subsequent reactions will help reveal the necessity for a solution to the
dilemma surrounding executive privilege. Furthermore, a demonstration of
the frequent use of the privilege helps support its legitimacy. As Rozell
stated, "the frequent exercise of presidential authority creates a strong
or
presumption of validity, especially when such authority has been accepted,
128
not effectively challenged, by the coordinate branches of government."
A.

PRE-NIXON

The seedlings for the tree of executive privilege were planted very early
on in our national history. As early as 1792, a committee of Congress
requested papers and records from the executive to assist them in investigating
a military expedition against Native Americans." 9 President Washington
recognized the potential for harm to the public with the release of some
presidential material and convened with his cabinet to discuss the appropriate
response to what was the first congressional request for executive
information." Although the President eventually released the information to
the congressional committee, this instance was a block in the executive

127. See ITzHAK GALNOOR, GOVERNMENT SECRECY INDEMOCRACIES vii (1977), (where
Nixon is quoted concerning President Kennedy's secrecy during the Bay of Pigs invasion)
quoted in DAVID WISE, THE

PouTIcs

OF LYING: GOVERNMENT DECEPTION, SECRECY, AND

POWER 339 (1973). Author David Wise also reveals a statement from Nixon a mere three
months before the Watergate break-in where he said, "when information which properly belongs
to the public is systematically withheld by those in power, the people soon become ignorant of
their own affairs, distrustful of those who manage them, and-eventually-incapable of
determining their own destinies." DAVID WISE, THE POLTICS OF LYING: GOVERNMENT
DECEPTION, SECRECY, AND POWER 339 (1973).

128.
129.
130.

ROZEUL, supra note 6, at 32.
3 Annals of Cong. 493 (1792).
RozELL, supra note 6, at 33.
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privilege foundation as the President recognized the ability of the executive
to maintain secrecy over some information.'
Soon thereafter, President Madison took a strong step in defining and
protecting the rights of his office.'32 When Congress became interested in the
President's documents concerning the Jay Treaty, Madison sought an
amendment that would acknowledge the President's right to withhold any
papers that he felt would be dangerous to the interests of the public if
disclosed.'3 3 Madison, in the first full statement of the executive privilege
doctrine, 34 maintained that each separate but equal branch was the "proper
judge" of all of its people and activities.1 35 At this time, there had not been
any serious congressional challenge to the acts of withholding information by
the early Presidents. Indeed, congressional recognition of the privilege would
soon follow.
Shortly into the Nineteenth Century, the House recognized the executive
privilege for limited purposes such as when there was a potential for harm to
the public interest. 36 Presidents Madison, Monroe, and Jackson all refused
37
to comply with requests from the House to supply presidential information.

131. As Rozell writes, Washington's administration took an affirmative step in
establishing what is now known as the executive privilege by recognizing the right of the
President to keep information away from the hands of Congress. Id. at 33-34. Rozell also
establishes the significance of the occasion for future generations with his quote from Adam
Breckenridge who said, "this beginning of the executive privilege indicates.., the president
could refuse documents because of their secret nature, a category insisted upon by subsequent
presidents ever since." Id. at 34.
132.

JOSEPH BESSET'rE AND JEFFREY TUus, THE PRESIDENCY IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL

50-51 (1981). Madison was the leading author of the Constitution and is considered
by many to be a fruitful source for the Founders' intent as to the proper interpretation of the
document. See generally ROZELL, supra note 6, at 36 (discussing Madison's pivotal role in
shaping not only the Constitution but also the early validity of the executive privilege).
133. BESSETTE,supra note 132, at 50-51.
ORDER,

134. Id.at 51.
135. Id.
136. See ROZELL, supra note 6, at 38.
137. Id.In 1825, the House requested information from then President Monroe
concerning the "Steward Incident" but was denied the information because the President felt the
information "might tend to excite prejudices" and "would not comport with the public interest
nor with what is due to the parties concerned." Id. In 1832, the House requested information
from then President Jackson concerning U.S. talks with the Republic of Buenos Aires-and
again the President denied the release of the information responding that it would "not be
consistent with the public interest to communicate the correspondence and instructions
requested by the House so long as the negotiation shall be pending." Id. Later that same year,
Jackson buttressed the strength of the executive privilege when he denied a Senate request for
material relating to the removal of money from the Bank of the United States by saying that the
Senate could not compel him to divulge "the free and private conversations I have held with
those officers on any subject relating to their duties and my own." Id. at 39.
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In response, the House and the Senate revealed their collective belief in the
privilege when their requests excepted any material that the President
determined was not in the public interest to disclose. 3 Many more Presidents
adopted a policy of presidential discretion in withholding information from

congressional inquisitors when they believed nondisclosure was in the
public's best interest. Presidents Tyler, Polk, Fillmore, Buchanan, Lincoln,
Johnson, Grant, Cleveland, and Harrison all followed through with denials of
materials asked for by the House throughout the latter half of the 1800s. 3 9
What is critical to the position advocating the legitimacy of the executive
privilege is the general acceptance by the legislature of the privilege during

the Nation's infancy as the Framer's attempted to put into practice the

constitutional principles they had created. Even critics of executive privilege
cannot deny the early allowance, if not approval, of the right of the President
to withhold some information-with regard to foreign affairs as well as
domestic and military concerns-from the United States' version of the
"Grand Inquest."" ° Presidents of the next century would increase the
frequency of the invocation of executive privilege but would also meet with

a harsher reaction from Congress and the public alike.

In the early Twentieth Century, the scope of executive privilege was
broadened. What is recognized as a major turning point in the development
of the doctrine is the rigid stance taken by President Eisenhower in a letter to

138. Id. at 39.
139. Id. at 39-42. Among several denials of requested information, in 1842 President
Tyler wrote to Congress that he could not release any materials relating to northeastern
boundary discussions between the U.S. and the British because "in my judgment no
communication could be made by me at this time on the subject of its resolution without
detriment or danger to the public interests." Id. at 39. In another declaration of the right of the
executive to withhold information relating to its activities, Tyler declared that to disallow the
President discretion in this arena:
would deprive him at once of the means of performing one of the most
salutary duties of his office... To require from the Executive the transfer
of this discretion to a coordinate branch of the Government is equivalent
to the denial of its possession by him and would render him dependent
upon that branch in the performance of a duty purely executive.
Id. at 40. In denying information to Congress, President Polk stated, "I regard it to be my
constitutional right and my solemn duty under the circumstances of this case to decline a
compliance with the request of the House contained in their resolution." Id. at 211. President
Lincoln exercised great power to withhold information as he concerned himself with the federal
war effort. Id.
140. See Raoul Berger, Executive Privilegevs. CongressionalInquiry, 12 UCLA L. REV.
1043, 1058-1060 (1965). According to leading executive privilege critic Raoul Berger, the
Framers "patently modeled" the U.S. Congress after the British Parliament, thus making the
U.S. Congress this nation's "Grand Inquest."
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Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson in 1954.' 41 The letter instructed
executive employees not to testify, with regard to conversations among highranking officials, during the army-McCarthy hearings. 42 The letter stated:
[b]ecause it is essential to efficient and effective administration that employees of the Executive Branch be in a position
to be completely candid in advising with each other on
official matters, and because it is not in the public interest
that any of their conversations or communications, or any
documents or reproductions, concerning such advice be
disclosed, you will instruct employees of your Department
that in all of their appearances before the Subcommittee of
the Senate Committee on Government Operations regarding
the inquiry now before it they are not to testify to any such
conversations or communications, or to produce any such
document or reproductions. This principle must be maintained regardless of who would benefit by such
43
disclosures.
Although President Eisenhower's uncompromising stance on executive
privilege received some criticism, it proved to bolster the position of
Presidents and their top aides in protecting what they thought to be sensitive
and private communications.' 4
President Kennedy expanded the scope of the privilege mostly in the
area of foreign policy. When a House Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations requested that the President's military supervisor testify regarding the
Bay of Pigs invasion, Kennedy ordered him not to do so. 4 President
Kennedy later ordered the Secretary of Defense not to testify to the House
relating to military Cold War education and speech review policies. 46 The
chairman of the Subcommittee ruled in favor of Kennedy's invocation of
141.

ROZELL, supra note 6, at 44-45.
142. Id.at 45.
143. Id.
144. Senator Joseph McCarthy (R-Wisc.) termed Eisenhower's order as an "iron curtain"
and declared it as 'the first time I've ever seen the executive branch of government take the fifth
amendment." FRED I. GREENSTEIN, THE HIDDEN-HAND PRESIDENCY 205, 207 (1982), quoted
in ROZEU, supranote 6, at 45. Other critics saw Eisenhower's position as granting too much
power to the executive--perhaps allowing any executive branch officer to assert the privilege.
FRED I. GREENSTEIN, THE HIDDEN-HAND PRESIDENCY 205,207 (1982).
145. RICHARD M. PIOUS, THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 352 (1979).
146. Military Cold War Education and Speech Review Policies,Hearings Before the
Special PreparednessSubcomm. of the Comm. on Armed Services, 87th Cong., 2nd Sess., 50809 (1962).
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executive privilege and the Subcommittee subsequently upheld that ruling.147
the use of the privilege in the realm
President Kennedy effectively expanded
14
of foreign policy decision-making.
President Johnson continued to accept the validity of the executive
privilege doctrine while the practice of formally requesting a President to
clarify his position on executive privilege began. 49 Despite professing to
limit invocations of the privilege to the President alone, 50 during Johnson's
administration Special Counsel to the President DeVier Pierson refused to
testify to the Senate Judiciary Committee concerning a recent Supreme Court
nomination: 5 '
[i]t has been firmly established, as a matter of principle and
precedents, that members of the President's immediate staff
shall not appear before a congressional committee to testify
with respect to the performance of their duties on behalf of
the President. This limitation, which has been recognized
by Congress as well as the Executive, is fundamental to our
system of government." 2
Although the privilege was now firmly entrenched in the battles over
information between Congress and the President, it was not until the Nixon
administration that the exercise of the privilege reached its most expansive,
and abusive, stage.
B.

THE NIXON ERA

No educated discussion of the need to define legitimate invocations and
conflict resolution techniques concerning executive privilege would be
complete without a discussion of the Nixon presidency's contribution to the
147.

Id. at 513-14.

148. Despite his expansion of the privilege, when asked to clarify his position on
executive privilege President Kennedy replied that it could be invoked by the President alone
and that it would not be used "without specific presidential approval." ROZEIL, supra note 6,
at 47.

149. Rep. John E. Moss (D-Calif.), who was vigorously opposed to the use of executive
privilege, began a practice of asking for clarification of the president's policy concerning the
privilege. Id.
150. See Statement before the Subcomm. on Separation of Powers of the Comm. on the
Judiciary, 92nd Cong., 1st Sess., 278 (1981) (stating President Johnson's response when asked
to clarify his position on executive privilege--he replied that, following former President
Kennedy's policy, claims of the privilege "will continue to be made only by the president").
151. Nominations ofAbe Fortas and Homer Thornberry, Hearings Before the Comm.
on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 2nd Sess., pt. 2, 1347 (1968).
152. Id.
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debate. The Nixon administration marked a turning point and a fundamental
change in how the doctrine was exercised and received. During the Nixon era,
executive privilege was invoked not for the protection of national security
interests, foreign policy decision-making, or military secrets (as in past
administrations), but rather to keep secret politically damaging and personally
unfavorable or embarrassing information.
The Nixon administration had initially professed an "open" presidency
where information would flow freely from the executive to Congress (and
ultimately to the public).' Furthermore, Nixon's official policy was not to
sway from that of his predecessors as the privilege was only to be invoked for
"the most compelling reasons and only the president could decide whether it
was appropriate to assert" the privilege." In practice, however, President
Nixon moved away from this open policy and in fact allowed other executive
officials to invoke the privilege.' 5 5 Following numerous invocations of the
officials, 5 6 the Watergate
privilege by Nixon, or on behalf of executive
5 7
head.
a
to
scandal brought the controversy
In response to the break-in at Democratic offices in the Watergate hotel,
the Senate Watergate Committee was created to investigate alleged illegal and
unethical activity. Subject to this investigation, the Committee called various
executive aides to testify. On July 16, 1973, one such aide testified before the
Senate Watergate Committee that President Nixon had tape-recorded
conversations with various aides and advisers in the Oval Office and in the
Executive Office Building.' Subsequently, the Committee, as well as the
Watergate special prosecutor, requested the tapes, but both were denied access
153.

154.

ROZEU., supra note 6, at 63.

Id. at 65.

155. Nixon's guidelines on the use of executive privilege became extremely broad-based
for on numerous occasions agency heads refused congressional requests for information and
refused to testify before Congress. Id. at 66. Allowing subordinate officials in the Nixon
administration to invoke a privilege over information and testimony even prompted Congress
to legislate to curtail such claims (despite an official policy of President Nixon to do just the

same thing). Id. at 67.
156. During several controversies over congressional access to information (including
Tr contributions to the 1972 Republican National Convention, proposed underground nuclear
tests, nominations to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, and military assistance
programs), Nixon sought to restrict information and testimony from agency heads by giving
them secondary positions as members of his personal staff. Id. at 67-70. Earlier, Nixon had
stated that his personal staff could not be forced by Congress to release information because the
President is entitled to have confidential interchanges with such trusted advisers. Id.
Furthermore, the President added fuel to the controversy by not always making it clear who had
actually made the decision whether to assert the executive privilege. Id.
157. Rozell refers to the Watergate scandal as the "most celebrated case in history of the
executive privilege controversy." Id. at 70.
158. Id.
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via a claim of executive privilege.'59 After several more requests were denied,
the special prosecutor went to a federal court which promptly issued a
subpoena duces tecum to the President-and again the President refused to
deliver the material claiming executive privilege." When a new special
prosecutor 6 requested additional tapes in April of 1974 and was again
rebuffed by a claim of the privilege, a federal judge demanded the tapes be
turned over for in camera inspection." This order was appealed by Nixon's
attorney and the Supreme Court granted certiorari prior to the lower court's
ruling. 63 As discussed in the Introduction section of this comment, the
Supreme Court ultimately rejected Nixon's claim of executive privilege over
the requested materials and believed the in camera inspection was a protective
method for the court to determine the nature of the material and its potential
risk to the public interest. Essential to this discussion, however, is the reaction
to this scandal.
As a result of President Nixon's invocation of the doctrine of executive
privilege as an unfettered, unlimited, and absolute shield to protect from
disclosure potentially embarrassing, and legally and politically damaging,
information-as opposed to legitimate national security material-Nixon
helped perpetuate public distrust for private government action." Although
the Nixon Court's decision was a victory for supporters of executive privilege
legitimacy, Nixon's abuses of that privilege, in the words of Rozell, served to
"politically discredit a legitimate, necessary constitutional power of the
presidency."'' 6 Following the Watergate scandal, the public began to equate
government secrecy with political wrongdoing and corruption'66 and the
doctrine of executive privilege continues to stand in the middle of this public
ire.

159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Nixon had fired the original Watergate special prosecutor in response to a ruling
of the Court to allow the subpoena duces tecum to stand after Nixon's appeal. Id.
162. Id. at 71.
163. Id.
164. Despite recognition by the Nixon Court of legitimate uses of the privilege, President
Nixon overstepped the implied boundaries by invoking the privilege not for national security
or military interests but rather to further cover up wrongdoing at the White House. See
generally ROZELL, supra note 6, at 80-82 (discussing the abuse of this "constitutional
doctrine").
165. Id. at 82.
166. Miller, supra note 11, at 638.
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POST-NIXON

Following the relatively "open" presidencies of Ford and Carter, the
debate over claims of executive privilege raged on during the terms of
Presidents Reagan, Bush, and Clinton. Perhaps even more telling is the highly
critical backlash from members of the legislature and the public in kind that
has resulted from even the hint of such a claim. President Reagan's assertion
of executive privilege during a congressional investigation of Canada's energy
policy marked the beginning of what has become a common trend in the
modem era.' 67
President Reagan ordered then Secretary of the Department of Interior,
James Watt, to refuse disclosure of certain documents to the House Committee
on Energy and Commerce's Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee. 6 8
President Reagan professed that he sought to protect from disclosure
"sensitive cabinet level deliberations" and to avoid "premature disclosure of
foreign policy deliberations which could compromise ongoing diplomatic
relations with Canada."' 69 However, after negotiations between the President
and the House failed, the Subcommittee subpoenaed the remaining documents
and the full Committee voted to hold Watt in contempt.' 0 A mere day before
the full House was to vote on the contempt claim, the White House gave up
its executive privilege claim and released the documents subject to some
security restrictions.' 7 ' This surrender of the privilege claim-marked what has
become the modem trend: Presidents assert the claim of executive privilege
and then are forced to retract the claim and capitulate under political
pressure.

72

This trend continued during a heated and protracted debate concerning
the refusal of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to release to
Congress certain documents pertaining to agency enforcement of hazardous
waste laws. 73 Two House subcommittees' 74 experienced problems obtaining
167. See Miller, supra note 11, at 654-57.
168. Id. at 654-55. The President stated, "lilt is my decision that you should not release
these documents, since they either deal with sensitive foreign policy negotiations now in process
or constitute materials prepared for the Cabinet as part of the Executive Branch deliberative
process through which recommendations are made to me." Id.
169. Martha M. Hamilton, Executive PrivilegeInvoked to Back Watt, WASH. POST, Oct.
15, 1981, at DI2, quoted in Miller, supra note 11, at 655.
170. id. at 656.
171. Id.
172. As the President gave up his claim of executive privilege during the Watt
controversy, the ranking Republican on thq Subcommittee termed the agreement to disclose the
requested information as a "capitulation." Id. at 656-57.
173. See ROZELL, supra note 6, at 117.

174.

Both the Oversight and Investigations Subcommittee of the House Committee on
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information during their investigation of the EPA regarding the enforcement
of "Superfund" regulations. 75 Upon the orders of President Reagan, then
EPA administrator, Anne Gorsuch, invoked executive privilege to withhold
subpoenaed documents.' 76 Shortly thereafter, the full House voted to cite Ms.
Gorsuch for contempt and certified the contempt citation to the United States
Attorney for presentment to a grand jury."7 However, a couple of weeks later,
President Reagan relented and allowed the Subcommittee members to view
The President recognized the detriment that could be
the documents.'
caused by a modem-day assertion of the privilege. As one commentator
indicated, the President "confirmed that public perception, not the underlying
law enforcement interests, strongly influenced his ability to maintain
government secrets."' 79 President Reagan, acknowledging the modem public
perception of executive privilege invocations, stated that he could "no longer
insist on executive privilege if there is a suspicion in the minds of the
American people that it is being used to cover up wrongdoing."'8 0 Again,
despite an initial strong stand on executive privilege, the administration
backed down amidst political pressure and committed "total capitulation."''
Invoking the executive privilege subjected the Reagan administration to the
costs of "a congressional attack, media frenzy, and political
inevitable
, 82
defeat.' 1

Energy and Commerce and the Subcommittee on Investigations and Oversight of the House
Public Works and Transportation Committee conducted investigations. Id.
175. "Superfund" was a $1.6 billion EPA program aimed at abating hazardous waste.
Miller, supra note 11, at 657. The investigations involved alleged mismanagement and political
manipulation of the direction of the program. Id.
176. The White House believed that disclosure of these "enforcement-sensitive"
documents might compromise the govemnent's strategies and aid defendants. Leslie Matland,
House Unable to get Subpoenaed Data, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 17, 1983, at BI 1, cited in Miller,
supra note 11, at 658.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 659.
179. Id.
180. Daniel Benjamin, Mutually Assured Corruption,WASH. MONTHLY, Jan. 1986, at
12, quoted in Miller, supra note 11, at 659.
181. Counsel to the clerk of the House, Stanley Brand, defined President Reagan's
decision to release the subpoenaed documents as "total capitulation." Phillip Shabecoff, Mrs.
Bofford Quits at EPA, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 10, 1983, at Al, quoted in Miller, supra note 11, at
659.
182. Robert G. Karser, EPA Fiasco,WASH. POST, Mar. 6, 1983, at Cl, cited in Miller,
supra note II at 661-662 (suggesting that what began as policy differences between Ms.
Gorsuch and the Democrats in the House escalated into a scandal when the President did the
unspeakable: he invoked the executive privilege).
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The Bush administration demonstrated just how far the doctrine of
executive privilege has fallen into political and public disrepute.'83 President
Bush's policy concerning the privilege was never officially announced but his
strategy was to "further the cause of withholding information by invoking
executive privilege only if absolutely necessary."' 84 His administration
withheld information from Congress many times without bringing attention
to what had become a very controversial doctrine.' 85 However, as Rozell
suggests, by downplaying the doctrine of executive privilege (in fear of
receiving the scrutiny and backlash of the public and Congress) the Bush
administration further weakened the privilege "by failing
to articulate or
86
defend any constitutional arguments for its exercise."'
Media scrutiny and the backlash resulting from executive privilege
assertions continued into the Clinton administration. A few examples suffice
to show how claims of executive privilege play out in the most modem
scenario. In 1993, the House Government Reform and Oversight Committee
investigated the circumstances surrounding several Travel Office firings in
May of that year. 8' The Committee requested some 40,000 pages of
documents to which the White House asserted executive privilege over about
3,000.88 Keeping step with the punch/counter-punch system that has
developed between Congress and the executive in this arena, the Committee
voted to hold White House counsel Jack Quinn and two former White House
aides in contempt of Congress after the executive refused to comply with the
request. 8 9 The White House received more backlash when the Committee
chairman criticized the President's decision to assert executive privilege:

183. See generally ROZEU., supra note 6, at 124-40 (discussing the use of executive
privilege during the Bush administration).
184. Id. at 125.
185. Id. Rozell points out that the Bush administration was so weary of invoking the
privilege (and ultimately paying the political price for such an invocation) that it used other
names for justifying the withholding of information such as the "deliberative process privilege,"
"attorney-client privilege," "attorney work product," "internal departmental deliberations,"
"deliberations of another agency," "secret opinions policy," "sensitive law enforcement
materials," and "ongoing criminal investigations." Id. The author goes on to suggest that the
Bush administration demonstrated that it may be easier to withhold information in the modern
era by avoiding the doctrine of executive privilege altogether and, instead, citing other
justifications for withholding material. Id. at 139.
186. Id. at 126. Rozell states that President Bush was "content to effectively concede
the constitutional issues over executive privilege to the opponents to satisfy his short-term
political need to avoid constitutional conflict while at the same time blocking congressional
committees and the public from attaining certain information." Id.
187. Miller, supra note 11, at 664.
188. Id. at 665.
189. Id.
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"[e]xecutive privilege has only been invoked once in this decade and never by
President Clinton who once claimed to [have] the most open and cooperative
administration in history but has now turned to a Watergate legal loophole to
prevent legitimate oversight by Congress."'" Following the modem trend, the
President released some of the information hoping to avoid the contempt
proceeding. However, due to embarrassing revelations discovered in the
released pages 9 . and continued pressure for full disclosure, the White House
was forced to capitulate as to its claim of executive privilege.

In the Spring of 1998, President Clinton asserted a claim of executive

privilege over a request for information concerning his alleged affair with
92
Monica Lewinsky and a subsequent cover-up.' Limiting the discussion of
this scandal to the issue of executive privilege, the President's assertion of the
privilege was immediately met with comparisons to Watergate cover-ups and
corruption. 93 And again, as per the modem scenario, the President's lawyers
advised relenting on the executive privilege claim because of the unfavorable
94
Ultimately, the
media and congressional reaction to its invocation.
relating
questions
answer
to
jury
grand
President himself testified in front of a
95
to the investigation of the Lewinsky matter.
In the Fall of 1999, President Clinton was again faced with harsh
criticism when he invoked the executive privilege to protect documents
concerning a clemency offering to Puerto Rican nationalists convicted of
190.

Committee to Vote on Contempt of Congress Resolution in Travel Office Matter,

Government Press Releases, Federal Clearing House, Inc., May 8, 1996, available in
WESTLAW, GOVPR database, 1996 WL 8786618, quoted in Miller, supra note 11, at 665.
191. The released documents revealed the Clinton administration had requested
confidential FBI reports of political rivals and former Reagan and Bush employees. Id. at 666.
The FBI director called the requests unjustified and "egregious violations of privacy." George
Lardner and John F. Harris, FBI Chief Says Request for Files was Unjustified, WASH. POST,
June 15, 1996, at Al, quoted in Miller, supra note 11, at 666.
192. The President sought to prevent two of his top aides, Bruce Lindsey and Sidney
Blumenthal, from testifying to a grand jury regarding the Lewinsky case. See Kathy Kiely, New
Starr Query Irks White House, N.Y. DXLY NEWS, June 2, 1998, available in 1998 WL
11034626.
193. See generally No Executive Privilege, CAPrrAL TIMES, Mar. 24, 1998, at A6

(supporting a similar public reaction to the claim of executive privilege during the Watergate
investigation).

194. Amid accusations that the White House was attempting to stall special prosecutor
Kenneth Starr's investigation into the Lewinsky matter, President Clinton's lawyers said that
they would give up the claim of executive privilege in the case. See Kiely, supra note 192,
available in 1998 WL 11034626.

195. Prior to President Clinton's appearance before a grand jury, a Federal District Court
Judge, District of Columbia, ruled that the President's top aides, as well as Secret Service

agents, could be forced to testify declaring that there was no legal basis in preventing such
testimony. John Gibson and David Bloom, Internight Newscast, MSNBC, May 22, 1998,
available in 1998 WL 6633482.
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terrorist activity. 96 The public questioned the motivations behind the
President's use of the executive privilege.197 One commentator recognized the
political climate with regard to modem invocations of the privilege:
[b]ut if Congress and the American people persist in
questioning the decision-in other words, if the issue
becomes more than a temporary blip-Clinton may well be
forced to choose between revealing the basis for his decision and allowing people to believe that he granted clem-

ency for wholly improper reasons. That is how executive

privilege is ultimately reconciled with the public's desire
for the truth. 19
As these several examples of post-Watergate claims of executive
privilege suggest, it is time for a restructuring of the President's legitimate
constitutional prerogative. Continually, the President is forced to curtail a
claim of executive privilege in response to congressional and media pressure
suggesting that the President is using the doctrine to hide embarrassing and
politically damaging information or evidence of corruption.' 99 In addition, as
the Watergate scandal (and perhaps the investigations of subsequent
administrations) demonstrates, the President and the executive branch have
not always invoked the executive privilege on valid, legitimate grounds. In
response to the deterioration of the valid exercise of this constitutional
prerogative, a system must be implemented to define its legitimate invocations
and to establish relief when conflicts arise over congressional demands for
executive information.

196.

See Clinton's Pardons Stir BeliefHe's Abusing PrivilegePower,supra note 1, at

A12 (stating, "if the president has nothing to hide, why would he want to withhold the relevant

information?").
197. See, e.g., Jennifer G. Hickey, New InvestigationsHit Pay Dirt, WASH. TIMES, Oct.

18, 1999, at 8 ("(t]he Senate Appropriations subcommittee on Commerce, Justice, State and
Judiciary meanwhile took up the blanket claim of executive privilege invoked by Clinton to hide
documents relating to the clemency decision, widely believed to have been an effort to gain
favor for Hillary Clinton with Puerto Rican voters in New York").
198. Peter J. Wallison, Clemency Call Privileged But Should Be Explained, SEATrLE
POST-INTELUGENCER, Sept. 23, 1999, at A19.
199. See Miller, supra note 11, at 668-69 (noting that during the Travelgate
investigation, the President at least partially relented his privilege claim a mere 21 days after his
counsel had made the assertion and eventually made full disclosure of the material only 25 days
after that).
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Im. THE FUTURE: LIMITATIONS AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION
"The pattern of executive branch recriminations against legislators for
meddling where they don't belong and legislative branch accusations that
executive branch failure to divulge all information constitutes criminal activity
2
has been unhealthful to our governing system." ' In order to expedite the
return to legitimate invocation and recognition of the doctrine of executive
2
privilege, it has been suggested that a few points must be recognized."' First,
it must be recognized that the executive privilege is a legitimate constitutional
doctrine that has been validated in several ways: by the writings of the
constitutional Framers; the residuary powers contained in Article II of the
Constitution; its historical exercise.; congressional acceptance; and by judicial
opinion. 2' Second, the privilege is not an absolute and unfettered presidential
power-it should be exercised only when necessary to serve compelling
reasons.2 0 3 Last, steps can be taken to hasten the resolution of executive
privilege dilemmas: limits must be delineated on the legislative power of
inquiry and the executive power to claim executive privilege, and judicial
intervention must be allowed to resolve escalated disputes. Though no
°4
guidelines are fool proof nor immune from misapplication, these suggestions help provide a framework for the areas of this debate by infusing
positive direction and foresight. °5
A.

LIMITATIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE LEGISLATURE

Congress may enact guidelines that restrict the exercise of executive
privilege "if such guidelines are based on Congress' constitutionallyenumerated investigatory power insofar as it is constitutionally 'necessary and
'
proper' to carry out legislative functions." These guidelines should declare
200. ROZELL, supra note 6, at 142.
201. Id. at 142-43.
202. Id. at 143.
203. Id.
204. Rozell suggests that it is not wise to attempt to create a remedy that would eliminate
"any" potential future conflict and declares that the "resolution to the dilemma of executive
privilege is found in the political ebb and flow of our separation of powers system." Id.
However, this comment suggests that some congressional formulations could help expedite the
process of defining even the allusive boundaries of the privilege and could stimulate efficient
resolution to disputes.
205. It is recognized that any boundaries must necessarily be broad as it would be
fruitless to attempt to identify all the potential circumstances under which the privilege may be
invoked. However, "[i]n the interests of expediency within and public perception of the system
as a whole, broad guidelines would still confer substantial value." Weiner, supra note 4, at 806.
206. See Weiner, supra note 4, at 807-08 (citing language from the Court's opinion in
McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135, 174-76 (1927)).
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what Congress may and may not do with the exercise of this constitutional
power, such as delegating authority to investigate to a commission, allowing
a commission to issue investigatory subpoenas, and/or punishing witnesses
who will not comply by certifying those people as being in contempt of
Congress.2 "° Such guidelines would serve to stem executive fear of what it
may view as unfettered discretion in congressional fact-gathering activities.
It is imperative that, when establishing these guidelines, Congress recognize
that its power to investigate is not unlimited-such power is typically
warranted only where the request for information is related to Congress'
ability to perform its constitutional functions.2 8 Furthermore, Congress'
power of inquiry is weakened when it comes to national security concerns or
military secrecy matters. These areas have traditionally been protected under
claims of executive privilege because confidential communication between
executive officials becomes imperative for effective negotiation with foreign
leaders and with regard to efficient and successful implementation of military
strategies."
Congress has recognized that its power to investigate is not limitless. As
early as 1879, the House Judiciary Committee declared that neither the
legislative branch nor the executive branch has absolute power to control the
documents of the other.2 1° In addition, Congress statutorily authorized the
withholding of information by the executive branch in the Freedom of
Information Act of 1966, which created exemptions for various documents
" ' Such
and communications. 21
statutory language could provide beneficial
precedent for the proposed congressional guidelines because it is a codified
example of how Congress has formerly carved out legitimate executive
withholdings of information.2 12
All guidelines would necessarily be made under the illuminating light of
the Court's decision in Nixon. It is clear that the Court was not receptive to
an executive privilege claim supported by a general interest in privacy or
confidentiality when balanced against the specific need for evidence in a
pending criminal trial. 213 Although the decision in Nixon does not provide
207.
208.

Id. at 808.
Id.

209. Id.

210. Id. at 809.
211. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C.A § 552 (1966).
212. For example, the Supreme Court held that exemption (5) applies only to policymaking material and does not apply to factual statements. Environmental Protection Agency
v. Mink, 410 U.S. 73 (1973). The Court held that if a document contained both types of
material it must be submitted to the Court for in camera review in order to remove the
unprivileged portions. Id.
at 88-89.
213.

See Nixon, supra note 17, at 713.
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answers to all questions of when the privilege will necessarily be upheld or
defeated, it does provide Congress with a framework as to which communications will be considered presumptively privileged and which will be
considered too general to defeat competing interests.2" 4 Congress could utilize
this holding as a baseline rule from which further executive privilege
invocation guidelines could be forged.
B.

LIMITATIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE EXECUTIVE

The aforementioned proposal for congressional regulation of executive
privilege claims may go beyond the power of Congress to investigate. It may
also restrict an executive privilege claim to the President alone. Some
commentators suggest that limiting the invocation of the privilege to just the
President would be an exercise in futility.215 Presidents would simply assume
a Nixon-like strategy of obscuring the actual source of the claim by making
agency heads members of the President's personal staff.2" 6 However, this
deceptive behavior could be limited by requiring the President to articulate the
source of an executive privilege assertion at its inception. Furthermore, an
active response by Congress to positively reinforce this presidential prerogative should stem executive skepticism with regard to departmental secrecy.
Ultimately, with structured congressional recognition of the privilege, the
President will not feel compelled to develop various methods and policies to
preserve confidentiality such as were employed by the Nixon, Reagan, and
Bush administrations.2t 7
Limiting executive privilege claims to those communications directly
involving the President would not leave presidential aides and advisers
without protection for their interests in confidentiality. The deliberative
process privilege will serve as protection for such individuals during a
congressional investigation or perhaps in the litigation setting. The In Re
Sealed Case"' court defined this as a common law privilege that "allows the

214. The Nixon Court stated that presidential communications are presumptively
privileged and suggested a necessary balancing of various interests when determining the

legitimacy of a privilege claim. Id. at 708-11.
215. Weiner, supra note 4, at 188.
216. President Nixon partook in this practice and attempted to obscure whether it was
the President or one of his subordinates who actually made the decision to assert the privilege
in any given case. ROZELL., supra note 6, at 67-68.
217. See discussion supra Section II. See also ROZELL, supra note 6, at 108 for a
detailed summary of the various methods invoked by these Presidents to withhold information
without specifically invoking the executive privilege.
218. 116 F.3d 550 at 557, overruled by Swidler, et al v. United States, 524 U.S. 399
(1998).
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government to withhold documents and other materials that would reveal
'advisory opinions, recommendations and deliberations comprising part of a
process by which governmental decisions and policies are formulated.' 21 9
This privilege is distinct from tlhe presidential communications privilege,
which attempts to throw "a blanket of confidentiality over all communications
among officials of a certain level."22 In contrast, the deliberative process
privilege is more narrowly tailored to ensuring "the expression of 'candid,
objective, and even blunt or harsh opinions' and the comprehensive exploration of all policy alternatives before a presidential course of action is
selected.""22 The deliberative process privilege protects only those communications relating to executive decision-making.222 Congress need not be
concerned that use of this privilege could be overly extended to protect
communications over a large number of executive branch members. Courts
have limited the privilege to "communications authored or solicited and
received by those members of an immediate White House adviser's staff who
have broad and significant responsibility for investigating and formulating the
advice to be given the President on the particular matter to which the
communications relate."'' Congress could implement a similar restriction to
limit the powers of the President with regard to such communications. Such
a restriction would reduce the fear of mass, blanket claims of executive
privilege from numerous members of the executive branch (or by the President
on behalf of other members of the executive) such as was the norm in the
Nixon era. Although the President may need to become more selective in
determining who is privy to presidential communications, the restriction
would not be unduly burdensome. Furthermore, Congress and the public alike
would recognize that the President could not assert claims of executive
privilege with abandon, but rather he would necessarily become more
selective with such invocations in lieu of the limitation.
C.

JUDICIAL INTERVENTION WITH ESCALATED DISPUTES

Commentators, and a study of the case history, indicate that once
Congress challenges a presidential assertion of executive privilege, the
President faces "insurmountable disadvantages and effectively is unable to
219. In Re Sealed Case, 116 F.3d at 557.
220. ConstitutionalLaw-Executive Privilege-D.C. Circuit Court Defines Scope of
Presidential Communications Privilege-In Re Sealed Case, 111 HARv. L. REV. 861, 865
(1998) [hereinafter ConstitutionalLaw].
221. ConstitutionalLaw, supra note 220, at 866 (quoting Nixon, 418 U.S. at 708).
222. Id.
223. 116 F.3d at 573.
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negotiate with Congress, even though legitimate justifications for
nondisclosure may exist."' In the post-Watergate era, the public has a strong
distrust for governmental secrecy. Presidents who battle with Congress over
information often lose these negotiations and suffer detrimental political
consequences.' The President's ability to assert executive privilege has been
"greatly weakened" within escalated disputes as the public fails to recognize
the potential for congressional abuse of its power of inquiry.226
Political negotiation has proved unsuccessful in resolving informational
disputes between the legislative and executive branches. "Judicial intervention.., is necessary to check frivolous or unwarranted assertions of executive
privilege while simultaneously ensuring that executive branch functions are
'
not stifled or sabotaged by overly-intrusive congressional investigations." 227
One commentator states that such a dispute is "ripe" for judicial review by a
federal court when each branch has asserted conflicting constitutional claims
(i.e. when the President has asserted a claim of executive privilege and
Congress has voted to subpoena the disputed information).228 Once a
constitutional impasse has been reached and the dispute is ripe, either branch
would be allowed to seek a judicial resolution of the competing constitutional
claims in a civil proceeding. This would allow for adjudication by a federal
court before the conflict reached a criminal contempt proceeding where
conflicts of interest abound.229 And if Congress disagrees strongly enough
with a federal court adjudication supporting the President's claim of executive
privilege, it can always employ its ultimate weapon in checking the power of
2
executive branch officials through the process of impeachment. " Guidelines
224. Miller, supra note 11, at 634.
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.at 635.
228. Miller, supra note 11, at 681. Because in practice the two branches will continue
negotiations in most cases unless these events occur, judicial intervention is not appropriate
until this time. Id.
229. In a criminal contempt proceeding, the Justice Department is forced to prosecute
another member of the executive branch while at the same time it defends the President's
assertion of the executive privilege. In addition, this proceeding punishes the official who is
simply following orders from the President to assert a constitutional prerogative. Id.
Furthermore, executive branch policy states that a U.S. Attorney should not prosecute an officer
for contempt of Congress if the citation is based upon a valid assertion of executive privilege.
See Department of Justice Memorandum, May 30, 1984.
230. Miller, supra note 11, at 692. The failure of the President to disclose information
where the assertion of the privilege was found, by a federal court, to be constitutional would
present a formidable challenge to Congress during potential impeachment hearings. However,
the threat of such proceedings, suggesting perhaps that the President has abused the powers of
his office, would, at a minimum, make the President weary of making suspect claims of
executive privilege.
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could also be passed as to the standard of review imposed by the federal court
in these situations.
In determining whether the privilege claim is legitimate, the court would
institute a balancing test to determine whether disclosure of the information
in dispute harms the President's ability to perform his constitutional duties
more than withholding the information would harm the ability of Congress to
perform its constitutional functions.2"3' Again, the judge could review in
camera various documents, 'testimony, and affidavits supporting the two
positions in making this decision, which would inevitably involve some level
of subjectivity.2 32 The judge should attempt to facilitate negotiations and
settlement and should seek remedies that are not "overly-broad" or too
narrowly tailored to the unique circumstances of the case. 3 When a decision
is necessary, the judge should not feel obligated to pronounce winners and
losers, but rather should consider intermediate positions, thus abating the
feeling that negotiations between Congress and the President take place in a
"zero-sum" game.2 4 In addition, the court could reflect on the little case law
available addressing executive privilege disputes. The opinion in the Nixon
case, as mentioned above, would be a prime source for guidance during the
Court's decision-making process because it expounds on the legitimacy of the
privilege and also touches on the various areas of communication that will be
afforded protection. 2"
Allowing for a prompt judicial resolution of an information deadlock in
a civil proceeding could validate and protect the executive privilege. The
judicial resolution would shorten the battle between Congress and the
President over information and would ultimately get to the merits of the
dispute, cutting through the ineviiable political gamesmanship surrounding
executive privilege invocations. If the President were to receive judicial
recognition and protection of his interest in withholding the information, his
position would be validated in the watchful eye of the public. This would
lessen the harsh political consequences, mentioned above, felt by Presidents
in such disputes. Conversely, if Congress were to succeed, with judicial
backing, in obtaining the information from the President, at least the President's exposure to public skepticism would be limited in duration. Further231. Id. at 685.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. See also Peter M. Shane, Legal Disagreement and Negotiation in a Government
of Laws: The Executive Privilege Claims Against Congress, 71 MINN. L. REV. 461 (1987)

(discussing a problem-solving approach to these conflicts and the implications of dealing in a

"zero-sum" negotiation).
235.

See Nixon, supra note 17, at 692.
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more, the President would be forced to reevaluate his position regarding
similar executive withholdings when faced with the potential of losing an
escalated dispute over information.
CONCLUSION
Recent White House scandals and subsequent congressional investigations have highlighted the conflicts that arise between Congress and the
President with regard to the gathering and withholding of information.
History reveals a crippling effect upon Presidents who invoke the executive
privilege in the post-Watergate era. Furthermore, history demonstrates that
the privilege is constitutionally legitimate despite arguments to the contrary.
The best way to safeguard and protect what has been demonstrated to be a
constitutional executive prerogative is for Congress to implement a plan to
define (despite an inability to do so with absolute certainty or perfection) the
following: the extent of Congfess' power to investigate; the scope of
legitimate executive privilege claims; and the process for allowing judicial
intervention and resolution of escalated information disputes.
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